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From the preceding essays, but also from the general discussion around From 
Apology, two themes emerge as a constant source of puzzlement, not least to myself. 
How does the argument in that book affect – if at all – the way we do international 
law? And what does the claim to be “critical” really mean?  These are, I suppose, 
aspects of one larger set of problems that permeate the whole of that work. “Oh yes, 
it does describe the argumentative patterns pretty well. But it does not really change 
anything, does it?” One might approach this sort of query in different ways. It 
might be thought of as an expression of the classical theme about the relations of 
theory and practice in the social sciences. How do academic works influence the 
social world to which they are addressed? Or one might be more interested in the 
specific relationship between (academic) doctrines and legal practice – the 
“outside” and the “inside” of the legal profession.  
 
I tend to think that, overall, the most promising responses to such queries come 
from some sort of Marxism and that any plausible view ought to recognise the 
reflexivity of “theory” and “practice” – the way the two co-construct each other. 
One must also be aware of the stakes that affect, at each level, the choice of 
alternative (theoretical or practical) orientations – that is to say, the role played by 
power in academic institutions and the contexts of legal practice. Then there is the 
analytically different set of questions about how all of this is translated into the 
distribution of costs and benefits between human groups. The latter problem is 
particularly difficult in international law owing to the great distance between 
academia, practice and the lives of men and women that are implicated in the 
issues lawyers seek to deal with. As David Kennedy writes in his contribution, 
much could be done to clarify all of this. But I cannot even begin to undertake it 
here. Instead, I shall just very briefly touch upon the question of change in 
international law as it relates to the kind of structuralist or “deconstructive” 
enquiry performed in From Apology and in other works of that kind.  
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One aspect of From Apology that few commentators fail to comment upon is its 
pervasive and relentless, even tiring binarism. The main theory that it propounds is 
of course built on the dichotomy of “normativity” and “concreteness”, together 
with its homologies or transformations: sources/sovereignty; justice/will; law/fact; 
natural law/positivism; community/society; rules/processes; diplomacy/ 
Realpolitik and, of course, utopia/apology. All this seems to depend on a rather 
grander thesis about reality in some ways constituted as language and as such, of 
binary distinctions. In the new Epilogue, I have tried to make it clear that these 
dichotomies cannot be thought of as “problems” to be resolved but that they define 
the field within which “international law” is played out as a social practice. 
Without such oppositions, and the way they provide a thematic for international 
legal “speech”, there could be no international law in the first place. It is precisely 
this dichotomisation that many commentators find (rightly) so striking in this type 
of enquiry but also (wrongly, I like to think) somehow disappointing or counter-
productive in a soi-disant “critical” work. If all of international legal practice is an 
endless oscillation between opposite poles in which no solution is more plausible 
than any other solution, then it may be the case that (a) there can be no change at all 
and (b) there can be no critique, only an external description or an (internal) 
participation in international law.  
 
Among critical lawyers the theory of structural bias – that although no solution is 
more plausible than any other solution, particular institutions still prefer particular 
types of outcome to others, explained in the new Epilogue1 – is supposed to answer 
these questions. But it still fails to account for what reason a critical theorist – or 
indeed anyone with a political project – might have to believe that it is possible to 
participate in “international law” in the above sense so as to transform that bias. 
Would not the structures have to be completely overhauled in order to bring about 
a meaningful change? Or in terms that have been frequently addressed to me, why 
would one be entitled to think that it is possible to be “outside” international law as 
a critic with a political project and “inside” as a professionally competent “player” 
in the game? What really is the relationship between Chapter 8 and all that 
precedes it?   
 
When I think about this, I often recall a dance performance I saw towards the late 
1980’s, when I was writing From Apology, by the group of the Belgian 
choreographer Jan Fabre at the Old Student House in the centre of Helsinki. The 
performance began at 6 PM and lasted the whole evening, not finishing before close 
to midnight. The choreography was of extreme simplicity. It consisted of perhaps 
                                                 
1 FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA. THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT. REISSUE WITH A NEW 
EPILOGUE 600-615 (2005).  
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10 to 12 dancers proceeding in slow motion from one end of the stage to the other. 
Some ran, throwing themselves against the wall at each end, others crawled, 
hopped, or dragged themselves in various contorted poses, for almost six hours 
against non-descript background music. And in the middle there was one dancer 
who kept swinging a sabre, just swinging and swinging it, in slow motion. The 
immediately striking fact about that performance was its sheer length, 
accompanied by the apparently monotonous and repetitive moves of the dancers as 
they were slowly moving from one end of the stage to the opposite end, trying to 
avoid the sabre. I write “apparently” because although the choreography did not 
change, the performance went though a number of transformations that were 
impossible to locate at any single moment. But no such single transformation was 
needed, either. The fact of the sameness of the movements, when repeated over 
again in the course of the hours invited the audience to go though a series of 
different experiences of the performance so that although what in the end was in 
some sense (namely as a choreography) the “same” as in the beginning, was in 
another sense (namely as experience) completely different.  
 
An explanation of the difference in a choreography that also remained the same 
would point, among other things, to the physical exhaustion produced by moving 
about in slow motion for hours. Despite the strength and stamina of the dancers, 
their movements eventually became slightly unstable, their legs began to shake a 
little as they turned at each end of the stage, with the sweat on the bodies 
increasingly visible, as well as the anxiety in the movements and gestures as they 
passed the sabre-swinging dancer in the middle, growing increasingly unstable as 
the evening wore on. Simultaneously, the audience’s reactions changed. The initial 
surprise “So this is what it is!” Then boredom: “Oh if they would only stop, or turn 
around, or start to run really”, indifference: “Oh well, let’s have a drink and come 
back later”. And anguish “How long can this possibly go on?” To admiration: 
“Now this is really impressive…but what does it mean?” 
 
The relentless binarism in From Apology in some way resembles that Fabre 
choreography. It presents international lawyers like the dancers moving from one 
wall to the other in slow motion without a moment of respite or a place to stop that 
would be any more logical than any other place. The reader is positioned not unlike 
the Fabre audience. Being invited to watch or to read, at close range and in smallest 
detail, a very simple set of moves and gestures seeks to turn something familiar and 
predictable into a thing that is both strange and surprising. One is called upon to 
think about sameness and difference in a new way, about how something might be 
both identical (as choreography) and non-identical (as movements and experience) 
with itself.  The meaning of the Fabre performance at midnight had almost nothing 
to do with its meaning at 6.15.  
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It is in this sense that I do not think that From Apology describes a world without 
change, and international law as the “endless repetition of the same”. To invoke 
“sovereignty” in 1873, 1919, 1965 or 2006 is completely different, it is the 
performance of an act which apart from its most insignificant aspect – namely its 
verbal surface – has a completely different meaning to the speaker and to the 
audience. Historians involved in Begriffsgeschichte know very well that political and 
legal words are expressed in contexts and that their meaning depends on what 
claims are made by them in respect to other claims. What are they intended to 
support or to oppose as they are uttered?  The same I think is true of the binary 
distinctions in From Apology. As I try to explain in the new Epilogue, those 
distinctions can be captured in a grammar of the professional use of international 
legal language. But what points are being made by them, what “acts” are being 
carried out, can only be determined by reference to the context of argument and 
persuasion. Which interests or preferences are being supported or attacked by that 
language at any particular moment? International legal language plays a particular 
role in (international) society that changes in relation to the kinds of work lawyers 
are called upon to do, their professional preferences and inclination, their cultural 
and political positioning at any particular moment.  
 
This is also what not only makes it possible for anyone to be an “insider” and 
“outsider” at the same time but in a way compels lawyers into both roles. Or to 
continue the parallel, everyone is a dancer and a member of the audience. As a 
dancer-practitioner, one is choreographed to perform a limited number of 
movements in a particular style. However well one learns that style, however 
skilfully one executes the gestures and however admired one is by one’s colleagues, 
one is never in complete mastery of the performance. One becomes tired; routine 
may set in to destroy the freshness, or a new nuance attaches to the old movements 
by intuition and experience. And whatever meaning one seeks to convey by one’s 
dance, one is never a full master of that meaning but always hostage to what the 
audience “gets” from it. There is no “right” or “wrong” way to execute a certain 
movement or to defend a particular cause that would be independent from the 
preferences of those to whom the performance is staged.  
 
Which is also why, in order to be a good dancer one will have to go and see 
colleagues perform, to learn from them, to be a part of the audience, to imagine 
oneself as the dance critic, preparing a review for the weekend paper. And one 
would have to be responsive to other dancers when performing – not only when 
they swing a sabre, but particularly then. In law, this means reflecting on the 
meaning of one’s movements and gestures while on stage. Which audiences does 
the performance speak to; whose preferences does it highlight? How does it 
respond to the moves colleagues make? I do not think being a “good” international 
lawyers and being a “critic” of international law are in any way mutually exclusive. 
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In fact, I rather think the contrary. One of the problems with modern international 
law has been its routinization, the absence of reflection by the profession of its 
embedded preferences. It is not for nothing that the sub-title of my latest book is 
“The Rise and Fall of International law 1873-1960”. Here “fall” denotes the exit by 
international law from critical awareness, its failure to take the perspective of the 
audience for a while – to re-imagine itself as a “project” instead of a technique at 
the service of other peoples’ (aesthetic) preferences.  
 
So how might From Apology affect the way we do international law? Not by 
proposing a novel blueprint or by suggesting that it is all a waste of time. It seeks to 
have an impact on practice by demonstration: “Look here, this is what a competent 
performance in international law is”. A dancer looks at a video of last night’s 
performance. What effect does that have on the dancer? Surely the point of 
watching is to learn to be a better dancer. And is that good or bad?  Well, that 
depends on how you think about dancing, including its social and cultural role. The 
same with international law. From Apology is a description of how the choreography 
of a professional argument unfolds today. Do the arguments really convey the 
meaning the performers would like them to convey? This is left for the lawyers to 
assess. But the point of this is to make the lawyer a better lawyer. And is that good 
or bad?  Some would say that this depends on whether the outcomes correspond to 
this or that preferred set of outcomes or blueprint. A good lawyer in the service of a 
bad cause is particularly worrying. But then there are those – such as myself – who 
like to think that international law, like dance, is more than an instrument to fill the 
theatre, or the cash-box. It embodies historical experiences and ideals about the 
human future that move us and teach us and which we as professional men and 
women are called upon to invoke when giving our performances. If so, our success 




From Apology is written by somebody with a career as a performer and a critic. I 
think it is obvious that the two careers are inextricable and have supported each 
other. I am delighted that this is also the perspective from which the above essays 
have examined it. It is, as Christoph Moellers points out, a lawyer’s book, written to 
lawyers, not a philosopher’s or a sociologist’s manual about interesting 
international matters. It is also part of a collective venture. I continue to be stunned 
by David Kennedy’s ability to uncover the “dark sides”, a sensibility that this 
profession is so desperately in need of. I am impressed by, and imitate, styles and 
performances of younger lawyers such as Jason Beckett and Florian Hoffmann who 
have developed quite complex and intriguing movements in order to rid 
themselves of the tired antics of the mainstream or, as Mario Prost calls it, the 
“positivist blues”.  Jochen von Bernstorff’s fresh, political reading of Kelsen is a 
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prime example of what I think history of international law should become. I am not 
in the least offended by Anne Orford’s association of my project with the colonial 
experience (though she thought I might be): on the contrary, the voyage is about 
discovering access to the universal, too, and I note, with delight, that despite our 
different baggage, Rajagopal Balakhrisnan, feels himself a fellow traveller, with all 
the political and intellectual risks that such ambition involves.  
 
 
